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Using a panel of administrative Italian data (source: INPS), this paper provides new empirical 
evidence on the earnings mobility in Italy over a relatively long time period (1985-1996). 
Transition matrices have been used to document the extent to which Italian employees change 
their position in the earnings ladder from one year to the next. Separate computations for the 
population as a whole and for various subgroups have helped to shed light on the underlying 
causes of the observed patterns.  
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In the previous chapter we have analysed the Italian wage distribution and, in particular, what 
happened to its level of inequality over the sample period. We have concluded that, though to a 
lesser extent than in Anglo Saxon countries, wage inequality in Italy has significantly risen during 
the 1980s and the 1990s, at least when measured by the most commonly used distributional 
indicators. However, our cross-sectional study of wage inequality provides a series of snapshot 
pictures – each at a given point in time – of the relative economic positions of our employee 
sample, but does not shed light on how individuals’ fortunes change from one year to the next. 
How likely is it that someone who earns very little this year will be better-off next year or in ten-
year time? Put differently, is low-income, or high income, a persistent or a transitory state? 
  To answer these questions we now turn to the field of earnings mobility and empirically 
assess its presence in Italy during the 1980s and the 1990s. The importance of embarking on a 
similar enterprise need not be emphasised. On the one hand, the study of earnings mobility 
constitutes an integral part of a study of the labour market, providing information on how 
earnings change for different profiles of workers and occupations. In some jobs, earnings may 
grow faster because training opportunities are better, experience is gained faster or there is a 
favourable trend at the firm or sector level. Improvements in one’s pay may also be accompanied 
by a job change, in which case the transferability of the skills accumulated on previous jobs is 
crucial. Shedding light on these issues may be important for discussions on the policy 
intervention schemes to be implemented in the labour market.  
On the other hand, the study of earnings mobility assumes relevance for a correct assessment 
of trends in earnings inequality. For if individuals tend to change their positions in the earnings 
ladder from one year to the next, earnings inequality within a single year may look different than 
‘lifetime’ inequality, where incomes are instead measured over a much longer accounting period 
– at the limit the whole individual’s lifetime. Indeed, it has been shown that ‘lifetime’ inequality 
is necessarily lower than cross-section inequality if there is income mobility.
* This is because 
short-run fluctuations get smoothed out when we measure income over an extended accounting 
period.  
As a consequence, even if cross-sectional inequality shows an increasing pattern over time, 
lifetime inequality may be raising by less if the intervening economic and institutional changes 
are also making the earnings structure more ‘fluid’ or ‘mobile’, thereby making it easier than in 
the past for individuals to move about the earnings distribution.  
 
While it may appear intuitively clear that earnings mobility has to do with the extent to which 
individuals see their income – and their relative positions – change over time, various conceptual 
difficulties emerge when judging whether mobility is a desirable feature in a developed society. It 
is not even clear whether comparisons of alternative societies, based on distributional indicators 
such as social welfare/inequality measures computed over their cross-sectional distributions of 
individual well-being, need be supplemented by measures of income mobility at all. Indeed, one 
may argue that - to express a judgement about the institutional and economic structures of two 
alternative societies - computing their distributions of ‘permanent incomes’, or any other 
appropriate measure of well-being over the individual’s entire lifetime, is all what is needed. Such 
measures already embeds both information about the individual’s characteristics (endowments, 
preferences) which might determine his/her initial position in the distribution, as well as 
information about the dynamic processes (the individual’s economic decisions and the stochastic 
environment whereby they take place and produce their outcomes) responsible for any subsequent 
re-ranking of the individual’s position. A society may be regarded as “mobile” – or as one of 
                                                 
* As Shorrocks (1978) proves, if inequality is measured using a convex function of earnings (expressed 
relative to the mean), inequality of lifetime earnings (i.e. earnings measured over T years) is less than the 
average of each year’s inequality weighted by that year’s share in lifetime earnings, unless each cross-
section distribution is identical to the others and there is no re-ranking.   3 
“open-opportunities ” – when individuals are not hindered to achieve a better economic position 
than the one that merely happened to occupy at their births. Similarly, the institutional and 
economic structures of this kind of society would not raise insurmountable obstacles for the 
individuals to realize their desired plans (of career, consumption, investment) and, ultimately, 
would guarantee the achievement of individual freedom. At the other extreme, another society 
might be seen as “corporative” when its institutional arrangements are such that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for individuals to change their initial position and climb the earnings ladder 
through their decisions (e.g., working harder, changing jobs, obtain further qualifications) or even 
merely through chance. Those who have been lucky enough to fall into categories with 
guaranteed high-welfare profiles would probably defend this second type of society, ex-post. Ex-
ante, however, whether one society should be preferred to the other appears to be a matter of 
value judgements, and in particular of attitude towards risk. In effect, from the standpoint of an 
hypothetical not-yet born individual, the choice between the two societal arrangements is much 
alike the choice between two random lotteries, with the initial position of this individual, as well 
as his/her probabilities of subsequent changes of that position for better or worse ones, being 
revealed only after the choice is made. The personal attitude to risk-taking seems then to be a 
crucial determinant of that choice in this sort of “original position”. If so, then, different degrees 
of mobility might well be differently desirable according to whether one is a risk lover or is risk 
adverse. In one case or the other, though, one may argue that the final verdict may be based only 
upon a comparison of the distributions of lifetime individual well-being that the two societies 
produce, with no much role left for the study of the year-to-year dynamics.  
 
 However, there are at least two reasons why the more traditional approach that studies the 
patterns of changes in individual incomes from one year to the other - as we do in this paper - 
remains an important, if not indispensable, piece of information in distributional analyses. On the 
one hand, this may be the only feasible option, as the calculation of measures of individuals’ 
permanent incomes are often made difficult by the lack of suitable panel datasets. In particular, 
detailed longitudinal information on individual’s consumption is almost never not available, 
impeding the estimation of permanent incomes. On the other hand, even when such measures 
could accurately be estimated, not all problems would be solved anyway. In effect, whether one 
should look at lifetime or cross-sectional inequality is open to question and likely to depend on 
the prevailing economic and institutional environment. For example, individual’s lifetime 
incomes – the expected values of their income stream over their entire life – may be less 
appropriate than current income for fully assessing the individual’s economic circumstances if 
there are market imperfections that prevent the individuals to borrow or save as desired.  
 
While discussions on conceptual issues about earnings mobility may easily take us too far, the 
ambitions of the present paper are much more limited. In the following pages we will only 
provide descriptive evidence on the amount of earnings mobility existing in our data, without 
being able to fully explain the observed outcomes nor to provide any verdict on its the desirability 
from a social welfare point of view. In recent years research on earnings mobility has seen a surge 
of interest among academics and policymakers. The increasing availability of new panel data sets 
- both at a country and cross-country level - has certainly contributed to this trend. A certain 
number of studies have empirically assessed mobility for countries where these data exist, and in 
some cases cross-country comparisons have been carried out too (e.g., OECD, 1996). In Italy 
research on earnings mobility has been mainly undertaken using previous releases of the INPS 
panel, comprising a five-year time horizon, from 1986 to 1991 (see Contini et al, 1998). In the 
present chapter we update their analysis in two main ways. Firstly, we extend the covered time 
period to include each year from 1985 up to 1996. The possibility of studying earnings mobility 
over longer time periods constitutes a research opportunity, if not a privilege, that cannot be 
missed. The availability of long panel databases is, in fact, still a rare item in both developed and 
undeveloped countries, and Italy is no exception. Secondly, we also supplement earlier analyses 
with various subgroup decompositions of the sample, so as to shed some light on the underlying 
causes of the observed mobility patterns and trends, as done in the previous chapter. 
   4 
 
 
2 Methodology   
 
Contrary to the analysis of earnings inequality and its trends, which only required a series of 
cross-sectional distributions, the longitudinal nature of our data becomes essential for the 
estimation of earnings mobility. In this case, in fact, to decide whether a person has experienced 
some ‘mobility’ in his/her earnings it is required that the person be observed in at least two points 
in time, which constitute the basic feature of panel data.  
According to an intuitive and generally accepted view, earnings mobility has to do with 
whether, and to what extent, the ranking of the individuals in the distribution alters from one 
period to the next. However, when one comes to the business of empirically assessing this 
phenomenon things get a bit blurrier. The measurement of earnings mobility, in effect, has not 
received as much theoretical attention as has the measurement of earnings inequality, and there is 
no real consensus on what is the most appropriate measure.
† Of the alternative approaches that 
have been proposed and employed to summarize and compare earnings mobility, we focus on 
transition  matrices, a conveniently easy-to-use tool, which provides a lot of descriptive 
information on the patterns of mobility.
‡  
Basically, this approach requires first that the overall earnings range be divided into a given 
number of earnings classes. In most of the analysis presented in this paper, earnings are calculated 
as annual remuneration divided by the number of days the employee is reported to have worked 
during the year. As explained in Box 1, chapter X, the resulting daily wage is then multiplied by 
an average month of 26 days so as to obtain monthly earnings. Sensitivity analysis considering 
the implications of having annual earnings as the object of our mobility investigation has mainly 
been carried out with reference to regional differences, in section 6. Until then, however, we will 
only focus on monthly-earnings mobility.  
For our calculations, we have formed five earnings bands defined as follow: 
 
band 1 : earnings from 0 to 65% of the distribution median; 
band 2: earnings included between just above 65% and 95% of the median; 
band 3: earnings included between just above 95% and 125% of the median; 
band 4: earnings included between just above 125% and 155% of the median; 
band 5: earnings above 155% of the median.
§ 
 
The earnings cut-off that defines “low-pay” is often chosen at 65 per cent of the median 
earnings, and we comply with this practice too.
** Band 1 therefore identifies the “working poor”, 
which labour market analyses are naturally particularly concerned on.  
Secondly, each individual is classified as belonging to one of these classes in year t. Finally, 
the earnings class for the same person at year t+k, with k positive integer, is traced from the panel 
                                                 
† See, for example, Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992). 
‡ Another commonly used indicator is the correlation coefficient for earnings in two years, a summary 
measure of the degree of persistence in individual earnings. However, its main disadvantage, shared with 
any "aggregate" indicator, is that it ‘squeezes’ all the information contained in a transition matrix into one 
number only. 
§ An alternative would be to define transition matrices on the basis of a quintile partition of the earnings 
distribution. In this case, the various bands may well have different width, depending on the shape of the 
distribution. When the ranges are instead defined as proportions of the median, the classes have the same 
width (with the exception of the first and last classes). See Revelli (1997) and OECD (1996) for further 
explanations.  
** This amounts at defining low-pay as a relative concept, where the focus is on the position of each 
individual relative to the earnings distribution. An alternative would be to look at low-pay in terms of a 
minimum acceptable standard of living, thereby complying with an absolute definition of low-pay. See the 
introduction to the book of Sloane and Theodossiou (1998) for further comments on the two positions.    5 
data.
†† The probability that an individual in class i in period t moves into class h in period t+k can 
be written as Pih, and is estimated by the proportion of employees who are observed to follow 
such a pattern. The matrix P with elements pih such that ∑ hpih=1 is the transition matrix. This 
simply means that, by construction, the sum of the elements in each row of a transition matrix is 
equal to one. Figure 1 below represents a typical example of the transition matrices we have 
computed for our analysis. Probabilities are multiplied by 100 so as to improve readability. 
 
 
Figure 1: Transition matrices 
 
(a) Employees who are in the panel in both year t and t+k  (“closed  panel”)     
 
                 Earnings band in year t+k 
 
   1 2 3 4 5    
 1  p11  p12 p 13 p 14 p 15  100  
Earnings band  2  p21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25  100  
in year t 3  p31 p 32 p 33 p 34 p 35  100  
  4  p41 p 42 p 43 p 44 p 45  100  
 5  p51 p 52 p 53 p 54 p 55  100  
 
 
(b) Employees who are in the panel in year t and who may be or may not  
be present in year t+k  (“open panel”) 
 
      Earnings  band  in  year  t+k 
 
   1 2 3 4 5  Out   
 1  p11  p12 p 13 p 14 p 15 p 1out  100  
Earnings band  2  p21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25 p 2out  100  
in year t 3  p31 p 32 p 33 p 34 p 35 p 3out  100  
  4  p41 p 42 p 43 p 44 p 45 p 4out  100  
 5  p51 p 52 p 53 p 54 p 55 p 5out  100  
 
 
The first matrix (figure 1a) is calculated in reference to the group of workers present in the 
panel both at the starting year, t, and at the end-point year, t+k. In this case each worker, starting 
from a specific earnings class in the starting year t, may: (i) persist in the same class in t+k; (ii) 
move upwards, when the worker passes into a higher class in the year t+k; (iii) move downwards, 
where the end-point class is lower than the starting class. 
In Figure 1(b), on the contrary, the matrix is calculated starting from the set of workers present 
in year t who, k years later, are either still present in the panel (in the same or a different earnings 
class) or have left the panel -- an event we indicate as “out”.  As we have already explained (see 
chapter W.) the panel may be left for various reasons (unemployment, change to self-employment 
or to sectors not subject to payment of INPS) and, in any case, this means that the new earnings 
status of the worker cannot be observed.  In other words, while the probabilities illustrated in the 
first type of matrix are conditional on the contemporary presence of the worker in the two years to 
which the matrix refers, in the second type of matrix this condition is lacking.  In this latter case, 
for the line totals still to be equal to one it is necessary to include the “out” column, containing 
                                                 
†† Note that, to define the earnings classes in year t and t+k, the medians of the distributions in year t and in 
year t+k are used, respectively.   6 
the probability that the worker, starting from the j-th class in year t, has left the sample in t+k , 
pjout. 
 
In our discussion below we will often find it convenient to summarize the information 
contained in a transition matrix with an appropriate summary statistics table. Particularly relevant 
to our aims are ‘measures of persistence’ and - complementary to the first - ‘measures of 
mobility’, derived from a transition matrix. Moreover, we will also examine how the class 
occupied by the individual in the initial year influences the probability of leaving the panel.  
Persistence probabilities are to be found on the principal diagonal of a square transition 
matrix, like the one shown in Figure 1(a). In particular, we will focus on the behaviour of two 
such indicators. The first - which we denote with p(1,1) instead of p11 in the interest of readability 
- is an estimate of the probability of remaining ‘trapped’ in the lowest earnings class in the two 
observation years. The second – which we indicate with p(4,4) - represents the frequency of 
workers who are in a relatively high earnings class -- the fourth -- and who have remained in the 
same class at the end of the period: they have maintained a high gross earnings level in both 
periods t and t+k.  
A second group of indicators, this time relating to the degree of earnings mobility, considers 
the probability of changing earnings band in the period t+k compared to the initial period t. The 
upwards mobility is analysed by studying the cells that, in the matrix in Figure 1(a), lie above the 
principal diagonal. In particular, we will observe some individual probabilities of upward 
mobility, for example p(1,3), p(4,5) and some sum values, such as p(2,+) and p(3,+), which 
represent the sum of the probabilities lying above the principal diagonal calculated respectively 
for lines two and three in Table 1(a).
‡‡ The downward mobility includes the elements in the 
matrix in Table 1(a) that lie below the principal diagonal.  In this case, too, we will examine some 
specific transition probabilities and some aggregate values, such as p(3,-), p(4,-) and p(5,-), which 
in their turn are the sum of the probabilities that lie below the principal diagonal, calculated for 
lines 3, 4 and 5.
§§ 
From the matrix of the second type, Figure 1(b), we will chiefly use some elements of the 
“out” column, in particular cells p(1,out) and p(4,out), to study whether, and to what extent, 




Our investigation on earnings mobility in Italy will be based upon the computation of 
transition matrices for different time intervals, for the population as a whole as well as for various 
subgroups. First, we select individuals that are observed in two consecutive years – year t and 
year t+1 – and examine how far those who belonged to an earnings class in t continue to stay in 
the same class in t+1 or move to another class. This type of transition matrices should mainly 
capture short-run mobility. Next, we extend the time lag and consider the sub-sample of 
employees who are observed in t and year t+5 and repeat the same exercise. Finally, we have also 
explored the consequences of expanding the distance between the two points in time to 10 years, 
with the aim of summarizing long-run mobility.  
 
The Appendix to this Chapter (Table 16), for the two years 1985 and 1996, the start and end of 
our observation window, reports the numbers of workers in the initial five earnings bands on the 
basis of the INPS panel.  It is as well to bear these figures in mind when analysing the transition 
probabilities that will be presented, above all in those cases where the small number of workers 
present in a specific initial earnings band might limit the significance of the transition probability 
figures.  
 
                                                 
‡‡ For example p(2,+) = p(2,3) + p(2,4) + p(2,5). 
§§ For example p(3,-) = p(3,1) + p(3,2). 
*** The probabilities in Table 1(b) are less easily interpretable than those in Table 1(a). For example, of 
those starting in the first earnings band some will leave the panel, p(1,out). However, “out” may well mean 
in low pay, as long as it is in sectors other than those covered by our INPS data.    7 
Some final comments are in order before embarking upon the enterprise of putting the Italian 
earnings mobility under the microscope. Our first consideration arises from our use of a 
heterogeneous sample, in which employees with different characteristics coexist. To the extent 
that mobility differ across groups, a change in the sample composition by characteristics may give 
the impression that mobility is changing too over time, even in the absence of any significant 
alteration of the within-group dynamic features. Multivariate techniques are generally regarded as 
likely to provide more accurate descriptions of the observed transition probabilities and earnings 
dynamics, as they are able to control for composition effects potentially hidden in the simpler 
cross-tabulations by population subgroups we present in this chapter. These techniques are more 
advanced and less readily conveyed to the non-technical reader, though it is likely that the 
evidence derived from the two approaches be largely consistent with one another (see, for 
instance, Contini et al., 1998). For these reasons they have not been used in the present work.
††† 
 
Our final remark is to stress once more that - given the peculiarity of our sample, i.e. 
employees in the “regular” economy - the mobility we find in our data is likely to understate the 
mobility we would have found were the sample to include traditionally more volatile segments of 
the labour market, such as the self-employed, or more precarious workers such as those with jobs 
in the “hidden” economy.  
 
 
3  Main findings on Earnings Mobility 
 
 
Before looking specifically at the results we have obtained, we will briefly sum up some of the 
points on which we will concentrate and for which we will attempt to provide an explanation.  
Despite the different measurement methods for mobility and the different groups of workers 
considered, some important regularities that are common among the different countries have been 
identified (Atkinson et al., 1992; OECD, 1996). 
 
(1)  Mobility increases with the length of the time-interval considered.  
(2)  Mobility is higher for young people who are at the beginning of their working 
career.  
(3)  The cross-sectional variance of annual gross earnings reflects persistent differences 
in relative wages better than it does transitory differences.
‡‡‡  
(4)  Upwards mobility is greater than downwards mobility  
(5)  The probability of persisting in low earnings bands is very high if measured at 
intervals of one year, then drops rapidly, whereas the probability of persisting in higher 
earnings bands is also high after one year but drops much less rapidly. 
 
                                                 
††† Nor have we used, for the same motives, those approaches that allow the researcher to distinguish 
between the permanent and the transitory components of earnings. The ‘permanent’ component – which 
evolves slowly and predictably – reflects individual’s education, skills, age and the ‘premium’ attached by 
the market to such characteristics at each point in time. The ‘transitory’ component – arising from 
unpredictable shocks that generally exhaust their effects after a relatively short period - may instead arise 
from shocks that hit the macroeconomic environment, a specific sector or firm, or even a single individual. 
The mobility we observe in our data, as well as its trends, may then be due to mobility arising from both 
sources. Formal techniques exist that allow to estimate the contribution of the permanent and transitory 
components in the cross sectional variance of earnings (Lillard and Willis, Card, Cappellari (199x). These 
or other multivariate techniques may be then used to estimate the probability of being in the earnings class j 
in  t+k, given that the original class was h,  conditional to observable and unobservable individual 
characteristics (Lillard and Willis, Devicienti). 
‡‡‡ For instance, OECD (1996) reports that about two thirds of the earnings variance in a given year can be 
attributed to the variance of the permanent component of earnings, the remaining part been explained by 
the variance of the transitory component.   8 
From the study of the Italian case, further peculiarities emerge that we will concentrate on in 
the following sections.  In particular, Section 4 will illustrate and quantify in detail earnings 
mobility in Italy with reference to the overall population of employees; Section 5 will look at the 
characteristics of mobility in specific subgroups of employees; Section six will point up important 
regional differences emerging from the study of mobility in Italy through annual earnings, rather 
than through daily earnings referred to one month.  A final section will outline the overall picture 
of the results documented in this chapter and will offer some final reflections.  
4  Earnings Mobility in Italy: Aggregate Findings 
 
In this paragraph we will begin our analysis of earnings mobility in Italy.  Table 1 groups the 
most significant probabilities of persistence, mobility and exit from the INPS panel for all 
employees without distinction of gender, age or occupation.  These probabilities are calculated as 
the means of values corresponding to the various matrices that, keeping the time interval constant, 
can be calculated as t varies.  For example, the value of P(1,1) reported in column 2 has been 
obtained by calculating all the possible matrices at annual intervals (t, t+1) -  that is the matrices 
1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, etc. - and then calculating the mean of the various values for p(1,1) 
corresponding to each of them. The underlying one-year transition matrices are not shown in the 
interest of brevity.  
In Table 1 the following trends may be observed: the probability of persistence (section A) in 
the low-pay earnings band -- band one -- is in all cases lower than persistence in the higher 
earnings bands -- for example the fourth.  The persistance is high for matrices at only one year at 
intervals (above 50%) whereas it progressively decreases as the time interval is extended to 5 and 
10 years.  In particular, p(1,1) drops very rapidly, going from 54% (annual intervals) to 6% (ten-
year interval).  For the same intervals, p(4,4) drops much more slowly, from 66% to 25%.  
 
Table 1    Selected transition probabilities from year t to year (t+n) 
    (all  employees) 
 
transition probability  over 1 year 
(mean) 
over 5 years 
(mean)  
over  10 years  
1986-96 
(A) some persistence      
p(1,1)  54.28 11.30  6.13 
p(4,4)  66.00 43.24  24.84 
(B) upwards mobility      
p(1,+)  45.72 88.7  93.87 
p(1,3)  5.29 18.35 28.29 
p(2,+)  19.28 37.6  54.67 
p(2,4)  1.23 4.67  9.9 
p(3,+)  12.73 26.17  40.32 
p(3,5)  1.58 5.53 14.89 
(C) downwards mobility      
p(3,-)  14.30 17.34  16.49 
p(3,1)  0.79 1  0.96 
p(4,-)  18.38 21.73  17.38 
p(4,2)  2.39 4.08  4.33 
p(5,-)  12.39 14.41  14.24 
p(5,3)  2.24 3.97  4.6 
(D) leaving panel      
average
*  16.31 35.36  50.74 
p(1,out)  26.98 45.69  56.93 
p(4,out)  11.33 29.16  44.96 
Note: Each probability is computed as the average value over all possible transition matrices that can be 
computed over the interval (t, t+k) as t varies. 
* This average probability is obtained by averaging the 
five values p(j,out), j=1,..,5.  
   9 
 
The probabilities of upward and downward mobility reported in sections B and C of Table 1 
are the mirror images of the probability of persistence; they will therefore be higher for those 
starting in the lower-earnings bands, where persistence is weak, and lower in the higher bands 
where persistence is stronger. 
Analysis of the mobility indicators reported first and foremost confirms one of the regularities 
listed in the above paragraph: upward mobility is in general higher than the corresponding 
measure of downward mobility, that is workers who move from one earning band to another more 
frequently find themselves in a better position than they started from rather than a worse one.  For 
example, let us consider the probability, during a period of 10 years, of moving from band 3 to 
band 5, and vice versa.  The last column in Table 1 shows the probability of upward mobility 
p(3,5) to be 15%, while the corresponding downward mobility, p(5,3), is only 5%. In the same 
way, we see that the probability of rising to any of the classes above class 3, p(3,+), is 40%, 
whereas it is much less probable to descend to a lower class, the probability p(3,-) being only 
16%. A similar conclusion may be reached by examining the other probabilities illustrated in 
Table 1, and also from an examination of the cells of the single transition matrices from which the 
mean data reported in this Table have been derived. This empirical regularity reflects the 
predetermination in the pay structure in the Italian regular labour market and the strong link 
between wages and seniority. 
 
Further confirmation of this marked inertia in the earnings ladder for those remaining 
employed for long periods of time may be found by comparing upward mobility indicators for the 
different timeframes (section B): independent of the starting band, the probability of rising within 
the earnings distribution increases as the time interval increases. 
 
Transition to lower earnings bands (section C) is, consequent on what we have just seen, an 
occurrence that, on average, affects a small number of workers.  Comparison of the downward 
mobility indicators for different time intervals shows some noteworthy aspects.  The probability 
of descending the earnings ladder increases as the time interval is extended from 1 to 5 years, to 
decrease (or remain constant) at 10 years.  For example, the probability of moving from band 4 to 
a lower band, p(4,-), goes from 18% on an annual basis to 22% over five years and 17% over the 
ten year period. 
 
Lastly, section D of Table 1 reports the frequency with which workers leave the regular 
employment labour market, by initial earnings class. These percentages are very high: over the 10 
year period, on average 50% of those initially employed leaves employment
§§§. The probability of 
leaving the panel after 10 years, starting from band one, is however higher than this average, 
being approximately 57%.  Over the same period of time, those leaving the panel from band four 
are fewer, approximately 44%. 
It therefore does not appear that employment is left at random
****.  On the contrary, it is 
probable that groups of workers with starting characteristics and earnings typical of band one are 
more probably destined to leave the guaranteed world of employment to enter onto more difficult 
and uncertain roads, such as unemployment. 
 
Movements from dependent work to self-employment are likely to be hidden here: the annual 
probability of such event, however, is very low: in chapter 4 (-Marco-) it has been estimated to be 
about 1.5%
††††. Moreover such moves usually require a certain amount of initial investment, not 
within the reach of those in the low tail of the earnings distribution.  
Contini and Villosio (1999), using transition matrices provided by OECD for the period 1986-
1991 show that the observed pattern "is surprisingly similar across countries: for the first four 
                                                 
§§§ See chapter XX (Data) an explanation of the possible outcomes for those leaving the panel. 
**** The other probabilities of leaving the panel after ten years - p(2,out), p(3,out) and p(5,out) -are 49%, 
49% and 54% (values not shown in Table 1). 
†††† Using ISTAT data from LFS.    10 
quintiles, the higher the earnings (i.e. the quintiles of origin),  the lower the probability of leaving 
dependent work. In all countries,  the probability of exiting from the panel for workers in the first 
quintile of the distribution is between 60% higher to over twice as high than that of workers in the 
fourth quintile. 
On the other hand, if the quintile of origin is the fifth (i.e. if the individuals are near the top of 
the earning distribution in 1986), the probability of leaving dependent work turns upwards. The 
vast majority of movements out of dependent work (with the obvious exception of the retirees) 
appears to have a negative connotation, whether or not the state of destination is unemployment. 
People who earn a decent pay are less likely to move out  of employment than people at the 
bottom of the earning distribution." 
 
It is important to keep clearly in mind that the results presented in Table 1 are aggregate 
results.  It is highly probable that composition and selection effects contribute to determining the 
differences in the values and trendsof these probabilities for the different earnings bands.  Suffice 
it to consider the fact that, in the lower earnings classes, young workers at the beginning of their 
professional career are more frequently found; these are clearly characterised by different income 
dynamics than those of the groups that most probably make up the higher income classes, that it 
is older workers.  Considerations of this type may help us to understand, for example, why p(1,1) 
drops more rapidly than p(4,4) as the interval over which these matrices are computed is 
extended.  The younger workers -- frequent in band one -- generally have a higher probability of 
increasing their income than the workers typical of band 4, who are now at more advanced stages 
of their professional career, and who are thus generally characterised by more stable income 
profiles.  As the time interval considered is extended, an ever greater number of young people 
succeed in climbing the earnings ladder, whereas this is less frequent for older workers.  As a 
result, the persistence in the two earnings classes might well display the differential time pattern 
mentioned above.  Section 5 will go into these aspects of composition and selection in greater 
depth. 
For this purpose, we will divide the sample into uniform subgroups in terms of certain 
characteristics, and we will recalculate the transition matrices for each of these
‡‡‡‡. From these we 
will then extract the information held to the most significant, again in the form of selected 
probabilities, degree of persistence and degree of upward and downward mobility.  The sample 
will be subdivided by personal characteristics of the worker: gender, age and occupation.   
Regional differences will be examined in a separate section. 
 
 
5  Earnings Mobility and Persistence by Subgroups 
 
5.1  Persistence and exit 
 
The differences between groups of workers in terms of earnings mobility becomes more 
important and causes more concern the more certain categories of workers appear to be “stuck” in 
the position they occupy on the earnings ladder.  From this standpoint, a very long persistence in 
the lower paid classes would appear to be particularly serious.  This situation might herald a 
segmentation of the labour market, in which certain workers are condemned to low-quality jobs 
that are precarious and badly paid, access to jobs guaranteeing better prospects for employment 
and better pay only apparently being open to some categories. 
For the purpose of providing more information on this point, we will concentrate our analysis 
in particular on the differences among groups in the probability of persistence in the first income 
class, e.g. p(1,1).  As in the above section, we will flank this with the probability of persistence in 
a high-income band (band 4). 
Since we showed above that leaving the panel was not independent of the original income 
class, we will also document which categories of workers have greater probabilities of leaving the 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ Obviously, the relative position of each worker, in the two years to which each transition matrix relates, 
remains that calculated on the basis of the entire distribution.   11 
labour market, by initial earnings band.  In this connection we will give the probability of leaving 
employment for workers starting from earnings class one, p(1,out), and from class four p(4,out). 






Persistence and exit from the panel by gender 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Female      
P(1,1)  50.5 11.95  6.29 
P(4,4)  65.37 42.55  21.43 
P(1,out)  25.09 47.38  60.14 
P(4,out)  13.74 28.71  40.53 
Male      
P(1,1)  57.33 10.69  5.99 
P(4,4)  66.17 43.39  25.51 
p(1,out)  28.59 44.21  53.75 
p(4,out)  10.86 29.27  45.76 
 
 
The probability of persisting in band one, calculated as previously as the average of the 
probabilities over that period, does not appear to show any important differences between the 
genders: the risk of remaining trapped in low-paid jobs does not appear to depend on the workers’ 
sex.  Secondly, this probability follows the same trend both for men and for women: in both 
cases, p(1,1) drops as the interval of time considered increases, from 51% to 6% for women and 
from 57% to 6% for men. 
The probabilities of persistence reported above are the averages of the values calculated on the 
matrices for the different time periods.  As such, these averages do not enable us to see time-
based dynamics in the probability of persistence in low-paid jobs. 
Looking at the values of p(1,1) for women and men in the individual five-year matrices, 
(t,t+5), we may clearly see that there is a decreasing trend for women: persistence in the first 
income band is reduced from 15% to 10% from the first to the last of the five year profiles (Table 
2b).  On the contrary, p(1,1) does not appear to change significantly over time for men, remaining 
fairly constant at around 10%.  These trends confirm what we have already observed in 
connection with inequality: in relative terms the income position for women has improved 




Trend of p(1,1) over time by gender – five-year intervals   12 
 
The persistence in high earnings bands p(4,4) shows no substantial difference between women 
and men (Table 2).  In this case, furthermore, we do not even find any indications of differences 
relating to gender if we analyse the trend of these probabilities over time this: as we will see in 
more detail in later sections, once women reach relatively high earnings levels penalisation 
against them disappears. 
The frequency of leaving the panel for those employed at low earnings levels is on the 
contrary higher for women than for men, above all over the long term (10 years), whereas it is 
slightly less so in the short term (one year).  The proportion of workers who, starting from a badly 
paid job, are still in employment after ten years is 40% for women against 46% for men. 
The probability of leaving the panel after starting in earnings band four is overturned: it is 
slightly higher for women at one year, whereas it is commoner among men if the interval is 
extended to 10 years. 
These results shows that women face different scenarios than men, depending on the starting 
earnings level.  In the case of occupations with low pay, we might hypothesize that leaving the 
labour market on the part of women is the fruit of a meditated decision, in which the alternative of 
full-time occupation running the family and children is preferred to an ungratifying job with low 
economic returns and bad career prospects.  For those who succeed in reaching relatively well-
paid occupations, it would appear that they are more strongly attached to the world of 
employment than are men
§§§§.  
 
Table 3 evaluates indicators of persistence and exit from the panel, subdividing the sample 
into four age-groups. 
 
Table 3 
 Persistence and exit from the panel by age groups 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Age 15-24      
p(1,1)  56.66 6.62  3.51 
p(4,4)  50.54 30.07  17.26 
p(1,out)  23.52 39.26  49.74 
p(4,out)  22.20 30.47  38.76 
Age 25-34      
                                                 
§§§§ On this point see also: S. Burgess, L. Pacelli and H. Rees (1997) “Job Tenure and Labour Market 



















Female 15 13.81 11.05 12.74 10.54 10.85 9.68
Male 10.87 11.24 10.32 10.21 10.91 11.09 10.17
85-90 86-91 87-92 88-93 89-94 90-95 91-96  13 
p(1,1)  41.96 18.06  9.70 
p(4,4)  63.18 36.87  19.41 
p(1,out)  33.15 53.20  57.64 
p(4,out)  10.45 20.75  24.46 
Age 35-49      
p(1,1)  53.18 24.36  12.92 
p(4,4)  69.36 48.19  29.20 
p(1,out)  29.68 52.46  63.60 
p(4,out)  7.03 19.82  39.31 
Age 50-64      
p(1,1)  60.44 39.51  25.00 
p(4,4)  65.86 46.35  33.83 
p(1,out)  39.88 76.08  94.57 
p(4,out)  20.75 66.62  94.09 
 
The probability of persisting in the first earnings group, p(1,1), decreases as the time interval 
increases in all four age groups. On the contrary, p(1,1) increases as we move towards older age 
groups in the two longer intervals of time considered: for example, it goes from 7% for 
employees aged 15-24 to 40% for those aged 50-64 over the five year interval, and from 4% in 
the younger group to 25% for the older group over the 10 year interval.  With reference to 
transitions at one year and persistence in the lowest earnings band, the trend is slightly different: 
the older age group (50-64 years) has the highest probability, followed by the youngest workers 
(15-24 years) and lastly the two intermediate age-groups (respectively 35-49 and 25-34 years). 
These trends may be explained by the fact that younger persons begin their working career in 
the lower earnings bands, improving their earnings position subsequently by accumulating 
experience.  After one year this experience is not yet particularly significant, but it becomes 
important after five or ten years.  Those who, at an older age, find themselves in very low 
earnings bands, have on the contrary been “judged” by the market and their possibility of 
advancing in their career or increasing their income are the worse the older they become. 
The contrary is true in the case of persistence in the higher earnings bands: this state of affairs 
is much less frequent among younger persons than among older ones.  As we will see in more 
detail below, for young people in high salary positions the probability that this is a transition, and 
that they will find themselves with lower earnings in subsequent years, is very high. 
 
As expected, due to the incidence of retirement, the probability of leaving employment is 
closely connected with age, whatever the starting earnings band.  So it is not surprising to find 
that, in Table 3, 95% of workers who were aged between 50 and 64, independent of their earnings 
level, had left the employment market after ten years.  It is more worrying to note that the 
probability of leaving for workers aged between 35 and 49 is highly diversified by high or low 
earnings class, even if the time interval is extended.  The percentage of those who, in age group 
35-49, leave employment after one year is four times higher for those in the lowest earnings 
group than for those in the fourth group (p(4,out)=7%; p(1,out)=29.7%); the difference is still two 
and a half times after five years (p(4,out)=19.8%; p(1,out)=52.5%), and it is still marked after ten 
years (p(4,out)=39.3%; p(1,out)=63.6%).  This is the age range that is hardest hit by the 
phenomena and of “young in, old out”: young people enter (including through work-training 
contracts) and those above 40 are expelled in the form of early retirement, incentives to leave, as 
well as the so-called “CIG straordinaria” redundancy scheme
*****.  We can probably add that this 
phenomenon and has had a more marked effect on lower-paid workers. 
Secondly, it is plausible to expect it to be easier for young people employed in provisional or 
precarious jobs with lower salaries to end up in a sort of a vicious circle of low-
pay/unemployment in which badly qualified and poorly paid work is alternated with spells of 
                                                 
***** See Contini, Rapiti (1998); Malpede, Villosio (1999)   14 
unemployment or inactivity
†††††.  It is more difficult for this to happen happen to older workers, 
for whom the loss of a badly-paid job is more frequently linked to leaving the regular 
employment market for good.  This explains why p(1,out) increases with age. 
 
Lastly, in Table 4 we distinguish employees on the basis of their occupation at the beginning 
of the observation period.  The persistance of blue-collar workerss in the lowest earnings band is 
markedly higher than that of white-collars, in particular over the long-term, confirming the 
flattened blue-collar earnings profile.  After five years, the vast majority of those who began their 
career as white-collar workers and who have not left the panel have risen to higher earnings 
bands: in this connection, suffice it to observe that the complement to one of p(1,1) for white 
collars is 92%.  For blue-collar workers, over the same time-frame the probability is only 58%.  
After ten years, however badly they may have started, i.e. on the lower rungs of the earnings 
ladder, less than 2% of white collars remain in band 1, whereas the proportion is around 12% for 
the blue collars. 
The persistance in earnings band four is also higher for blue-collar than for white-collar 
workers.  If we combine this figure with the information on upward and downward mobility, 
analysed in detail in the next sections, we see that the greater probability of workers persisting in 
high earnings bands occurs to the disadvantage of further earnings increases.  Once they have 
reached a high earnings level, in most cases blue-collars remain in that earnings band, the 
alternative being a descent to lower rungs of the ladder. 
 
The probability of leaving the panel, whether starting from band one or from band four, is 
higher for blue-collar than for white-collar workers, indicating that the former more frequently 
find themselves in a precarious working situation than the latter. 
 
Table 4 
Persistence and exit from the panel by occupation 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Blue Collars      
p(1,1)  49.53 21.56  12.15 
p(4,4)  63.85 46.68  35.31 
p(1,out)  35.47 58.04  66.58 
p(4,out)  13.91 33.91  52.50 
White Collars      
p(1,1)  33.03 8.01  1.63 
p(4,4)  68.52 39.73  15.81 
p(1,out)  27.28 48.15  57.51 
p(4,out)  8.23 23.18  36.08 
 
In this case, too, analysis of the trend over time of the probability of persisting in low earnings 
bands during a five-year interval shows significant differences between the two groups: at the end 
of the period, blue collars have increased p(1,1) by one point, from 20.4% to 21.4%; white 
collars, on the contrary, have reduced it by seven percentage points, from 11.8% to 4.7%
‡‡‡‡‡.  To 
what extent these trends may be attributed to processes modernising the production organisation 
(that can implicate greater mobility), to greater efficiency in the encounter between labour 
demand and supply, or to selection processes relating to professional qualifications, is an open 
question, which does however appear consistent with the evidence presented here.  
 
                                                 
††††† This vicious circle between low-pay and unemployment has been documented for other countries too 
(see, Stewart 199x for the Uk, Cappellari for Italy, etc)  
‡‡‡‡‡ The weight of the two categories on the enetire distribution also changes: blue-collars are reduced from 
66% to 61%, whereas white-collars increase by 6 percentage points from 26% to 32%.   15 
Table 4 b 
Trend over time of p(1,1) by occupation – five year intervals 
5.2  Upwards Mobility  
 
In this section we will analyse in greater detail the upward earnings mobility for different 
groups of workers.  For clarity we will only report some particularly significant cells of the 
transition matrices computed for the various time-intervals.  We have chosen p(1,3) since it 
denotes the transition from the least satisfactory position to a median position, and p(4,5) since it 
reflects the progression of persons embarked upon a decidedly rewarding career. 
We will also report some probabilities of upward mobility as such, i.e. independent of the 
class of arrival.  For example, p(2,+) indicates the probability of transition from the second class 
to any of the higher earnings bands. 
 







  1 year  5 years  10 years 
female      
p(1,3)  4.94 13.13  21.27 
p(2,+)  14.56 27.61  41.17 
p(3,+)  10.53 21.47  34 
p(4,5)  15.70 37.08  64.55 
male      
p(1,3)  5.66 22.68  34.27 
p(2,+)  22.94 44.82  63.62 
p(3,+)  13.4 27.53  42.07 
p(4,5)  15.59 34.62  56.44 
 
 
A first important aspect is that for men upward mobility is higher, whatever the initial earnings 
class, and for all intervals of time.  For women it is presumably more complicated to embark upon 
a professional career offering an increasing earnings profile such as those of men.  A second 



















Blue collars 20.41 21.79 19.54 20.71 23.07 23.96 21.45
White collars 11.85 8.32 7.22 8.04 9.06 6.90 4.67
85-90 86-91 87-92 88-93 89-94 90-95 91-96  16 
difficult for women who start from the lower rungs.  It is here that the biggest differences 
compared to men are found.  On the contrary, once women have overcome the difficulty of the 
lower earnings bands, they are able to align themselves with men’s earnings patterns: at 10 years, 
p(3,+) is about 42% for men and 41% for women.  If we consider the probability of rising from 
band four to band five,women actually pass the men in each of the 3 timeframes considered. 
Once they have overcome the severe adverse selection operated by labour demand and 
reached the higher earnings bands (in 1985, for example, only 6% of women were in band four, 
versus 16% of men 
§§§§§), it appears that women succeed in consolidating their earnings status 
more effectively.  This phenomenon is not only explained by considerations linked to the 
selection mechanisms, but also by the sectorial composition of women’s employment: women are 
particularly concentrated in some protected sectors (for example the banking sector) in which the 
earnings progression is almost automatic and the incentive not to change profession is particularly 
high. 
We will now examine to what extent upward mobility differs in the different age groups 
(Table 6).  The age-group in which mobility is highest is that between 25 and 34 years.  The 
indicators considered are higher in this group for practically all time intervals and in all earnings 
bands.  We have already noted the strong link between career, age, and earnings profile, in 
particular for young workers who remain employed for long periods of time.  Thus, not 
surprisingly, we also note that it is these persons who reap the most benefit from lengthening the 
time interval, above all if they are in the lower earnings bands.  For example, p(1,3) for workers 
aged 15-24 goes from 3% if calculated at one year to 28% at 10 years; in the older categories, the 
probability goes from 7% to 19%.  Upward mobility starting from the median band, p(3,+), is 
lower for the younger age-group, on the contrary, if it is measured at one year, whereas when the 





by Age Groups 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Age 15-24      
p(1,3)  3.14 17.46 28.22 
p(2,+)  16.25 37.58  55.45 
p(3,+)  10.34 24.64  37.26 
p(4,5)  10.74 28.55  43.56 
Age 25-34      
p(1,3)  10.79 22.57  29.73 
p(2,+)  20.64 39.48  56.21 
p(3,+)  13.69 30.12  43.92 
p(4,5)  17.61 42.28  64.02 
Age 35-49      
p(1,3)  9.18 19.57 27.53 
p(2,+)  20.43 35.12  51.11 
p(3,+)  12.36 23.79  38.38 
p(4,5)  14.73 32.38  55.28 
Age 50-64      
p(1,3)  7.37 14.06 19.44 
p(2,+)  23.6 36.8 49.48 
p(3,+)  13.39 23.05  28.20 
p(4,5)  16.13 27.62  40.61 
 
                                                 
§§§§§ See Table 16 in the Appendix.   17 
Lastly, with regard to the difference in occupation, it is confirmed that upward mobility is 







  1 year  5 years  10 years 
blue collars      
p(1,3)  7.99 18.87 24.31 
p(2,+)  18.5 34.40 50.70 
p(3,+)  10.68 20.65  31.60 
p(4,5)  10.57 20.64  33.78 
white collars      
p(1,3)  13.35 28.02  36.23 
p(2,+)  24.24 51.17  69.97 
p(3,+)  18.15 40.96  61.92 
p(4,5)  21.14 50.34  78.56 
 
5.3 Downwards  Mobility 
 
Downward mobility is the subject of this section.  The descent towards lower earnings 
bands may be due to at least two reasons: firstly, market penalization of a worker who is 
considered not to be very productive; secondly, the result of a negative shock on labour 
demand, especially if it obliges a worker to leave his or her job and seek another in an 
adverse economic climate.  Downward mobility is, overall, lower than upward mobility, 
but in any case it remains significant, in particular for some categories of workers.  We 
will therefore look at its chief characteristics. 
In this section too we will analyse the phenomenon by subdividing the group on the 
basis of worker characteristics.  The indicators we will use are p(3,-), p(4,-) and p(5,-), 
which indicate downward mobility respectively from the third, fourth and fifth earnings 







  1 year  5 years  10 years 
female      
p(3,-)  18.83 23.27  23.37 
p(4,-)  18.93 20.37  14.02 
p(5,-)  20.39 21.6  20.71 
male      
p(3,-)  12.9 15.64  14.59 
P(4,-)  18.24 21.99  18.05 
P(5,-)  11.13 13.36  13.47 
 
 
Table 8 confirms the general disadvantage of women over men: their downward 
earnings mobility is higher.  There is however an important exception, represented by 
p(4,-).  Women in this earnings band, in fact, lose their position less easily: p(4,-) is 18%   18 
for men whereas it is only 14% for women.  We have already remarked in the previous 
sections that for women in the middle-to-high earnings class persistence and upward 
mobility are more frequent than for men; what we have here is simply the mirror image 
of those data.  In the highest earnings band (band 5), the frequency with which employees 
descend to lower earnings bands is again higher for women than for men. 
 
If we break the figures down by age-group (Table 9) we note the following 
irregularities.  Downward mobility in the youngest age-group is higher than it is for 
workers aged 50-64 years.  However, the lowest mobility is that of the 35-49 age group. 
The younger workers who earn very high salaries (in relative terms) are exposed to 
much greater volatility than all the others.  The higher the initial earnings band, the 
greater the frequency with which the youngest age-group (15-24) lose their relative 
positions.  This is a demonstration of the importance of the transitory component that 
distinguishes young people's earnings, and realignment occurs almost immediately.  The 
frequency of downward mobility is practically identical at 1, 5 and 10 years. 
 
In all age-groups, downward mobility becomes more frequent at a distance of five 
years.  The differences are slight, indicating that the earnings structure for employees is 
fairly well protected against negative salary shocks.  Furthermore, downward mobility 
appears to drop if the interval is extended to 10 years.  This might be explained by the 
fact that, in the cases of mismatching between company and employee, or between the 
employee and his pay class, are generally resolved -- in the form of salary and/or 
contractual repositioning -- within a few years.  Over the longer period, however, 
workers' selection has by now perfected the encounter between skills required and those 
possessed, and thus makes it less probable that subsequent downward earnings 





by Age Groups 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Age 15-24      
p(3,-)  25.9 27.29  23.14 
p(4,-)  38.72 41.38  39.18 
p(5,-)  65.16 70.87  70.59 
Age 25-34      
p(3,-)  14.62 16.65  15.42 
p(4,-)  19.21 20.85  16.57 
p(5,-)  18.95 18.58  16.33 
Age 35-49      
p(3,-)  10.90 14.25  14.74 
p(4,-)  15.91 19.43  15.52 
p(5,-)  9.76 11.58  11.59 
Age 50-64      
p(3,-)  12.23 16.99  20.68 
p(4,-)  18.01 26.03  25.56 
p(5,-)  9.15 11.88  12.50 
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Table 10 illustrates downward mobility for blue and white collar workers.  The 
difference between the two categories reinforces the conclusions drawn above.  Just as 
blue collars tend to have little upward mobility, to this is added their greater exposure to 
the risk of downward mobility, the more so when the time interval is a longer one and if 






  1 year  5 years  10 years 
blue collars      
p(3,-)  15.85 20.06  20.28 
p(4,-)  25.58 32.68  30.91 
p(5,-)  29.7 39.75  42.84 
white collars      
p(3,-)  9.73 9.60  6.76 
p(4,-)  10.34 9.93  5.63 
p(5,-)  7.98 7.50  6.08 
 
6 Regional  Differences  
 
In this section territorial differences on wage mobility are analysed. This analysis needs to be 
carried carefully, and we devote a whole section to it: regional differences are modest if earnings 
mobility is calculated (as we have done so far) on monthly pay, but very important differences 
emerge, however, if mobility refers to annual wage income.  This is still a rather unexplored issue 
from an empirical point of view, as data on annual wage income have become available only 
recently.  There is wide consensus on the idea that earnings mobility could be very different 
depending on what is being measured: annual wage income is the product of hourly (or daily) pay 
times hours (or days) worked. Both have their own sources of variability. Even if hourly pay were 
identical in the same industry across regions, annual wage income could be very different if 
working hours or days were sufficiently distant.  This turns out to be the case in Italy between 
North and South, with Central regions roughly in between, as we now turn to show.  
 
6.1  Persistence in low pay and attrition 
 
The first issue is on persistence in low pay p(1,1), and on the probability of leaving the panel  




Persistence and exit from the panel by region 
A) Monthly  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
North      
p(1,1)  53.74 9.65  4.84 
p(1,out)  21.89 38.06  49.82 
p(4,out)  10.00 28.34  44.65 
South      
p(1,1)  53.77 12.73  6.60 
p(1,out)  39.00 60.8  67.99 
p(4,out)  15.34 32.42  47.37   20 
 
B) Annual  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
North      
p(1,1)  60.19 21.92  23.71 
p(1,out)  32.27 33.47  54.32 
p(4,out)  4.95 24.94  43.36 
South      
p(1,1)  71.43 36.53  45.72 
p(1,out)  40.06 41.04  67.88 
p(4,out)  6.53 26.57  40.80 
 
 
Let us, for the time being, devote attention to earnings mobility calculated on monthly pay 
(Table 11, panel A).  While the differences in p(1,1) are modest  - persistence in low pay is only 
slightly higher in the South -   those in  p(1,out)  are impressively large:  21.89 in the North at 1-
year distance, against 39.0 in the South.   P(1,out)  increases rapidly at longer intervals in both 
areas,  while the difference stays roughly constant. In Northern regions, after 10 years only 50% 
of those starting their career in the lowest earnings band are still found in the panel; in the South 
their share drops down to 30%. It is well known that firm volatility, job turnover and overall 
precariousness is much higher in the South, and this explains why P(1,out) is so much higher.    
Interestingly, the probability of exiting the panel from the fourth earnings band -  p(4, out) -  is 
only slightly higher in the South:  if one's pay is already substantially above the median in 1986, 
there is a good chance that his/her employer is well established, probably not a small firm,  and 
that, unless the latter goes out of business, his/her career will continue with the same employer 
until and beyond 1996.  This holds in the North and in the South as well.    
 
Let’s now turn our attention to annual earnings, illustrated in panel B in Table 11. In this case 
differences in p(1,1) are stunning, with the probability in the South being nearly twice as much 
that in the North for the ten-year interval. Differences are still notable for the one-year and five-
year intervals. As annual earnings result from both daily pay and the number of days worked in a 
year, it seems plausible to attribute these differences to the higher risks that workers in the South 
face of getting jobs with a lower number of worked days than in the North.  
 
6.2  Upwards mobility  
 
As already mentioned, the probability of upwards mobility increases with the time distance at 
which mobility is calculated.  Often, i.e. for a fairly large number of people, this simply reflects 
the fact that as tenure with the same employer gets longer, his relative wage will increase in 
parallel.  For many there will be job changes between the beginning and the end of the 
observation years: but this is still consistent with the above explanation, as movers are often those 
with skills on high demand.   
In the South at 1-year distance, upwards mobility is slightly higher than at North; at 5 and 10-
year distance, however, the North overtakes the South. For instance, p(1,3) at 1-year distance is 
4.88 in the North against 6.84 in the South.  But, after 10 years, p(1,3) is 30.34  in the North, and 
27.31 in the South.  Upwards mobility from median pay is also higher in the North: p(3, +) after 
10 years  is 42.90 at North, and only 32.52 at South.  
 
Table 12 
Upwards mobility by region 
A) Monthly  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years   21 
North      
p(1,3)  4.88 18.10  30.24 
p(2, +)  19.38 38.91  57.08 
p(3, +)  12.34 26.76  42.90 
South      
p(1,3)  6.84 21.03  27.31 
p(2, +)  20.40 36.66  51.24 
p(3, +)  13.42 23.88  32.52 
 
B) Annual  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
North      
p(1,3)  10.91 20.05  31.22 
p(2, +)  25.29 42.58  57.02 
p(3, +)  12.80 22.54  43.38 
South      
p(1,3)  5.92 10.19  18.62 
p(2, +)  18.82 29.17  38.51 
p(3, +)  11.48 17.87  31.30   
If we turn to annual wage income, the probability of upwards mobility at North is not very 
different from what we see in the same area on the basis of monthly wages.  It is, instead, slightly 
lower in the South if measured over annual wage income, especially if the starting position is in 
bands 1 and 2 (the low tail of the distribution).    
 
Where the differences really emerge is the regional contrast: not surprisingly, upwards 
mobility, in terms of annual wage income, is much higher in the North than in the South, 
especially at 5 and 10 years intervals:  42.58 vs. 29.17 at 5-year distance, and 57.02 vs. 38.51 at 
10-year distance for p(2, +);  22.54 vs. 17.87 at 5-year distance, and 43.38 vs. 31.30 at 10-year 
distance for p(3, +). 
 
6.3 Downwards  mobility 
 
Table 13 
Downwards mobility by region 
A) Monthly  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
North      
p(3, -)  13.56 15.64  13.96 
p(5, -)  11.50 13.35  12.40 
South      
p(3, -)  15.42 20.09  20.58 
p(5, -)  16.76 19.54  21.88 
 
B) Annual  wages 
 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
North      
p(3, -)  16.32 30.46  17.79 
p(5, -)  10.96 28.91  11.70 
South      
p(3, -)  22.88 39.54  27.54   22 
p(5, -)  11.75 31.00  11.98 
 
 
We restrict attention to downwards mobility from median positions - p(3, -) - and from the 
highest earnings band - p(5, -). Overall, downwards mobility is somewhat higher, but not 
dramatically higher, in the South, whether measuring on monthly pay or on annual wage income.  
We have some surprises, however, if we look at the pattern as the time-distance increases:  the 
probability of downward mobility is humped, with an inverted U-shape, very slight if transitions 
are calculated over monthly pay, much more evident if measured over annual wage income. It is 
lowest at 1-year distance, it peaks at 5-years distance, and then it turns down again after 10 years.  
While we know that the panel gets thinner as time passes, due to exits from the panel for to 
different reasons (including exit towards retirement for those who are in the early fifties at the 
beginning of the observation period), there seems to be no obvious reason why should an inverted 
U-shape emerge. Controlling for age and industry would probably help to understand: this 
exploration will have to be postponed to a later date. 
 
While, generally speaking again, downwards mobility is a more likely event in the South, the 
interesting exception is p(5, -): here the likelihood of having one’s annual wage income reduced 
is identical in both regions. Not surprisingly: the fortunate ones who have pretty good jobs and 
pay (say in banks or large automotive industries) are covered by the same union contract all over 
the country, and - age constant- face the same chances of career downturn.  
7  Some results for other countries 
 
In the introduction we mentioned that there is some diversity between countries in the 
degree of rigidity of the salary structure.  On the contrary, from the standpoint of which 
workers have fewer advantages in salary mobility, the different studies are in substantial 
agreement. 
The features that increase the probability of remaining in the bottom part of the wage 
distribution are almost the same in all countries: typically women, workers with low skills, 
workers in small firms or in industries like construction and retail are not only more likely to be 
in low pay in any one period, but are also more likely to persist in low pay. Young workers, 
instead, are more likely to be in low pay in one period, but they are at less of a disadvantage in 
escaping from low paid jobs than older ones. 
 
The following table reports an overview of the main analyses on this subject. 
 
Table 14 Studies on the determinants of earnings mobility 
Study  Country, period  Methodology  Main results 
P.J. Sloane and I. 
Theodossiou (1996) 
"Earnings mobility, family 
income and low pay" The 
Economic Journal May, 106  
Britain 1991-1993 (BHPS) 
Low-paid threshold: third 





Higher probability of persisting in low-pay for: 
women, employed in firms with less then 500 
employees, do not have training to increase 
skills in current job, being a council tenant, 
having a permanent job, being in the 
construction or the distribution industry. 
P.J. Sloane and I. 
Theodossiou (1998) "An 
Econometric Analysis of low 
pay and earnings mobility in 
Britain" in Asplund et al. 
(1998) 
Britain 1991-1993 (BHPS) 
Low-paid threshold: less 




Higher probability of persisting in low-pay for: 
professional, full-time job, temporary jobs, 
short tenure, being employed in Wales. 
M. B. Stewart and M. K. 
Swaffield (1997) "Low pay 
dymamics and transition 
probabilities" mimeo 
Britain 1991-1994 (BHPS) 
Low-paid threshold: a) half 
the median; b) half the mean; 







1. Higher probability of persisting in low-pay 
for: those with low years of education 
completed, those without training in the 12 
months prior t-1, those not covered by a union, 
workers in plant with less than 25 employees, 






2. The estimated marginal effects on the 
conditional probability of remaining low paid 
are much reduced when taking into account 
endogenous selection. However factors such as 
training, plant size, union coverage and gender 
retain their influence on he probability of 
persisting in low pay (particularly for higher 
threshold). 
A. McKnight (1997) "Low 
wage mobility in a working-
life perspective" in Asplund et 
al. (1998) 
Britain (Family and Working 
Life Survey 1994/95) 
Low-paid threshold: 68% of 








Persistence is higher for: younger males in the 
lowest social class, for males in the older age 
cohorts, as the episode of low wage 
employment increases 
T. Eriksson (1997) "Long-
term earnings mobility of 
low-paid workers" CLS 
working paper N. 97-16 
Finland 1970-1990 (Finnish 
Quinquennial Population 
Census) 




Increasing persistence for women, for workers 
aged 35-49, for old workers 
R. Asplund, P. Bingley, N. 
Westgård-Nielsen (1997) 
"Wage mobility in the Danish 
and Finnish  private sectors, 
1980-1994" mimeo 
Denmark 1980-91 (Statistic 
Denmark Administrative 
Records) 
Finland 1080-94 (Finnish 
Confederation of Industry 
Employee records) 












Persistence in low pay is decreasing in 
Denmark and increasing in Finland. The impact 
of individual characteristics on low-pay 
mobility is in general not substantial and very 
similar across the two countries. 
C. Lucifora (1998) "Working 
poor? An analysis of low 
wage employment in Italy" in 
Asplund et al. (1998) 
Italy 1975-93 (INPS data) 
Low-paid threshold: two-
third of the median 
Transition 
probabilities 
Young workers have higher transition rates out 
of low pay; females have higher persistence in 
low pay. 
B. Contini, M. Filippi, C. 
Villosio (1998) "Earnings 
mobility in the Italian 
economy" in Asplund et al. 
(1998) 
Italy 1986-91 (INPS data) 




Higher probability of persisting in low-pay for: 
blue collars, women, workers in small firms, 
older workers, stayers. 
R. Van Opstel, R. Waaijers, 
G. Wiggers (1998) "Wage 
mobility of low-skilled 
workers in Netherlands" 
mimeo 
Netherlands 1986-89 (Social 
and Economic Panel) and 




low and high 
skilled 
workers 
low skilled workers have low prospect of 
upward earnings profile. General training rather 
than firm-specific training is the main 
contributor to individual’s earnings growth 
M. Keese, A. Puymoyen, P. 
Swaim (1998) "The incidence 
and dynmics of low-paid 
employment in OECD 
countries" in Asplund et al. 
(1998) 
15 OECD Countries 1986-91 
Low-paid threshold: two-
third of the median 
Transition 
matrices 
Higher probability of persisting in low-pay for: 
women, older workers 
Source: Contini Villosio (1999) 
 
Another similarity that holds across countries is the higher probability of exit from dependent 
employment the lower the earnings band of origin. We have already mentioned it on the 
aggregate. This pattern holds also when account is taken for gender and age as is shown in the 
following table. 
 
Tables 15 Selected studies on P(out/wage quintile) 
Study  Country, period  Main results 
P.J. Sloane and I. Theodossiou 
(1998) "An econometric analysis of 
low pay and earnings mobility in 
Britain 1991-1993 (BHPS)  
Low-paid threshold: less than 66% 
of the median 
Lower probability of remaining in employment 
if started out as a low paid for: younger, males, 
professionals, full-time job, those who have a   24 
Britain" in Asplund et al. (1998)  degree or equivalent qualification 
M. B. Stewart and M. K. Swaffield 
(1997) "Low pay dymamics and 
transition probabilities" mimeo 
Britain 1991-1994 (BHPS) 
Low-paid threshold: a) half the 
median; b) half the mean; c) two-
thirds the median 
About 16, 15% or 13% (according to the 
different threshold definitions) of those low paid 
in year t-1 are out of employment (self-
employed, unemployed or out of the labour 
force). 
Stronger for women than for men. 
Gosling et al. (1997) "The dynamics 
of low pay and unemployment in 
early 1990s in Britain" Institute for 
Fiscal Studies.  
 
British Household Panel Study 
(BHPS) 
Men in the bottom quartile of the earnings 
distribution are almost three times as likely to 
move out of work in the 12 months following the 
first-wave interview as men in the top quartile. 
The same effect, although less strong, is found 
for women. 
T. Eriksson (1997) "Long-term 
earnings mobility of low-paid 
workers" CLS working paper N. 97-
16 
Finland 1970-1990 (Finnish 
Quinquennial Population Census) 
Low-paid threshold: bottom 
quintile 
Low paid are more likely to exit into non-
employment than those further up in the earnings 
distribution. Stronger for women and older 
workers (over 35 years). 
ISFOL (1998) "Il lavoro in Italia: 
profili, percorsi, politiche" Franco 
Angeli, Milano 
Italy 1986-92 (INPS data) Low-
paid threshold: two-thirds the 
median 
Probability of being out of  employment is 
higher for low paid, women, older workers , 
workers in the south and in small firms. 
Contini, Pacelli, Villosio (1999) 
"Short employment spells in Italy, 
Germany and Great Britain: testing 
the "port-of entry" hypothesis" CEP 
Discussion Paper N. 426,  
Italy 1986-92 (INPS data) 
Britain 1991-94 (BHPS) 
Germany 1986-92 (GSOEP) 
Workers with short employment spells (SS) in 
year t are much more likely to exit employment 
between year t and t+3 than other workers. 





The wage structure for employment is characterised by career ladders in which to a great 
extent steps occur in a semi-automatic fashion, especially for those who are employed long-term 
by the same company, continuing up to retirement age.  The automatic mechanisms began to 
some extent to be attenuated in 1993, with the abolition of the sliding-scale system.  A 
comparative analysis among some European countries (introduction) shows that this inertia is 
stronger in Italy than in other EU member states.  This “stickiness” of the wage structure, together 
with the relative weight of workers with “long careers” (employees with seniority of more than 
seven years and fully paid-up social security contributions, account for over 4 million out of a 
total of 8.5 million workers) makes it normal that upward earnings mobility, from whatever 
position it is observed, is greater than downward mobility.  In theoretical terms, upward and 
downward mobility could only be equal in a situation in which income from employment were 
absolutely dominated by transitory components versus permanent ones.  Luckily (for the workers) 
that does not occur in any country in the world, least of all in Italy. 
It also follows that, in general, the longer the interval of time over which individual earnings 
mobility is measured, the higher is the probability of finding upward mobility, and that this 
reaches its highest values for young persons at the start of their career.  Among this latter group, 
persistence in a very low earnings band may remain high in the first years of activity (suffice it to 
consider the apprenticeship contract that has a duration of five years) but it is then natural that it 
reduces rapidly as the years pass, if the young person continues in regular employment.  In the 
case in point -- in the 15-24 age-group -- the probability of persisting in “low-pay” p(1,1) is 
approximately 57%, measured at one year; it drops to 7% at five years and to 4% at 10 years. 
Among young people, it appears evident that the transitory component in earnings is 
much more significant than among older groups: if at a distance of one year upward 
mobility in the 15-24 age-group is lower than in other age-groups -- it is not surprising 
that it takes more than one year to make known and promote ones skills -- the comparison 
with age-groups 35-49 and 50+ is overturned if mobility is measured at 5 or at 10 years.  
On the other hand, just as upward mobility is higher, the same is true for downward 
mobility at the beginning of one's career.  In particular, for the few young people who are   25 
lucky to start from particularly well-paid positions, the probability of falling to much 
lower levels within a few years is very high. 
Another important characteristic is the probability of leaving the panel.  These exits 
very probably mark a negative event in the life of the worker.  In the great majority of 
cases they mark the entrance into unemployment (which, unfortunately, we are not able 
to measure explicitly) or in any case the exit from “regular” employment.  The 
probability of entering self-employment is low: on the basis of ISTAT data (Chapter X) 
this probability may be estimated at around 1.5% per year; in the past it was estimated at 
around 10% of all separations detected in the panel (Contini, et al. 1996).  It is possible 
that leaving the panel coincides with starting work in the public administration, but this 
too is certainly a very rare event.  That it is a negative event emerges from the fact that it 
is inversly correlated with the initial earnings position: the lower the starting-point, the 
higher is the probability of leaving the panel.  The vicious circle “unemployment -- low 
pay – unemployment” would give rise to similar findings. 
The probability of leaving the panel definitively
****** among the younger age-group 
(15-24) is slight at one year, but rapidly rises to reach 50% after 10 years.  Among the 
older workers (50+) it is above 50% at one year and reaches 75% after five years.  This 
gives the impression that for all those destined to leave regular employment, this event 
occurs within relatively short times.  Adverse selection acts quickly: poorly qualified 
workers, and to a less lesser extent women, are the most badly affected categories. 
 
Of great interest are gender comparisons: men, who “historically” have the advantage 
of cultural background in modern societies, show a markedly higher upward mobility 
than do women.  However, once they have overcome the gender selection barrier and 
achieved a relatively high position on the earnings ladder, women maintain their position 
better than their male colleagues.  The probability of downward mobility from band four, 
p(4-), measured at five years, is 20% for women and 22% for men; at 10 years it drops to 
14% for women and 18% for men.  It is probable that this phenomenon may be explained 
partly by the sectorial composition: starting from the 1980s, women often entered into 
careers in traditionally highly-protected sectors such as banking.  It is also possible that 
the self-selection processes to which women are obliged to subject themselves later act to 
consolidate their position once they have reached it.  It should however be said that the 
hypothesis that sectorial composition is important is reinforced by the factor that the same 
phenomenon of consolidation in favour of women is not present if the starting-point is the 
highest band of earnings. 
 
Comparison between occupations shows that the higher upward mobility of white-collars 
versus blue-collars is counteracted by a greater probability of the latter to descend the earnings 
scale.  Thus not only are the prospects for career advancement and increased earnings decidedly 
lower for blue-collar occupations, but these positions appear to go hand-in-hand with greater risks 
and a more precarious situation. 
 
With reference to regional characteristics, it was seen that the difference between 
North and South is surprisingly slight when mobility is measured with reference to mean 
daily or monthly earnings.  When annual earnings are analysed, however, regional 
differences and the risk of persistence in lower earnings bands emerge with all their 
dramatic characteristics.  If we look closely, this may be explained by the fact that 
                                                 
****** Definitive leaving of the panel is defined in relation to the characteristics of our longitudinal sample, 
observable for 11 consecutive years (1985-96): clearly there is nothing to stop a person reentering “regular” 
employment 15 years after leaving it.  For now such an event cannot be observed in our data.   26 
comparisons are normally made between unit earnings (daily, or referred to one month in 
a standard formula: one month = 26 days).  Since the population we are observing 
comprises employees for whom social security contributions are fully paid-up, minimum 
contributions are respected.  But companies can hide a significant proportion of irregular 
work while respecting minimum contributions, and declaring a number of paid days 
fewer than those actually worked (INPS is not in a position to check this).
†††††† This 
habit would appear to be much more common in the South than in the rest of the country, 
further confirming the fragility of the economy of Southern Italy.  
 
                                                 
†††††† For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see B. Contini, M. Filippi,  C. Malpele,  “Safari nella 
giungla dei salari: al Sud si lavora di meno ?”,  Lavoro e Relazioni Industriali, vol. 1, 2001.   27 
9 Appendix   
 
Table 16 Distribution of observations in the INPS panel by earnings band 
 
1985  Sample frequencies  Row percentages 
 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 all  f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 











































































































1996  Sample frequences  Row percentages 
 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 all  f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
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